The Troubled History of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Introduction

On 11 October 2026, Pakistan’s federal government imposed emergency measures and Governor’s Rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), suspending the provincial government led by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). President Asif Ali Zardari approved the decision on the advice of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The federal government cited deteriorating security and the provincial administration’s alleged failure to control militancy, while PTI rejected the move as politically motivated. The decision has reopened a longstanding debate about democracy, provincial autonomy, and the use of extraordinary powers in Pakistan.

The history of this region, however, began long before PTI or the Taliban. It includes the non-violent struggle of Bacha Khan, the dismissal of an elected Congress ministry in 1947, the Babra massacre, and the struggle for provincial autonomy led by Wali Khan. Later, the Afghan jihad transformed the region into a centre of international militant activity.

The central historical question is whether repeated political interventions and inconsistent security policies have contributed to the instability they were intended to overcome.

1. Bacha Khan  

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly known as Bacha Khan, was born in 1890 in Utmanzai, in present-day Charsadda. He believed that Pashtun society could progress through education, social reform, discipline, and non-violent resistance.

In 1929, he helped organise the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, meaning the Servants of God. Its members became known as the Red Shirts because of their distinctive uniforms. They campaigned against British colonial rule and worked to improve education, social awareness, and community organisation.

Bacha Khan developed a close political relationship with Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. Their commitment to non-violence challenged the colonial perception that the frontier could be governed only through force.

The movement nevertheless faced severe repression. On 23 April 1930, British forces opened fire on protesters at Qissa Khwani Bazaar in Peshawar. The massacre became a major event in the struggle against colonial rule.

The Khudai Khidmatgars were more than a political organisation. They represented an alternative vision of Pashtun identity based on non-violence, education, and social responsibility. Their history challenges the stereotype that Pashtun politics has always been defined by armed conflict.

The creation of Pakistan, however, introduced a new political dilemma: what place would Bacha Khan and his movement have in the new state?

2. The Congress Government and 1947

In the 1946 provincial elections, the Congress-led alliance won a majority in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), as KP was then known. Dr Khan Sahib, Bacha Khan’s elder brother, headed the provincial ministry.

The All-India Muslim League demanded that the province join Pakistan. During the July 1947 referendum, voters were offered the choice of joining India or Pakistan. An independent Pashtun state was not included, and the Congress and Khudai Khidmatgar leadership boycotted the vote, objecting to the limited choices.

Pakistan emerged in August 1947, but the province’s political divisions remained unresolved.

On 22 August 1947, Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah dismissed Dr Khan Sahib’s Congress-led ministry. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan subsequently formed a Muslim League government.

The dismissal became a turning point in relations between the new Pakistani state and the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Supporters of Bacha Khan regarded the decision as a rejection of their electoral mandate and political identity.

Technically, the dismissal was not the same as modern Governor’s Rule under Article 234 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it formed part of the longer history of central intervention in provincial politics.

Pakistan had emerged from a movement that emphasised political representation, yet the new state soon faced a conflict over the rights of a province whose elected leadership had opposed the Muslim League’s political programme.

3. Babra Massacre- 1948

On 12 August 1948, a demonstration by Khudai Khidmatgar supporters at Babra, near Charsadda, ended in a massacre. Police and the Frontier Constabulary opened fire on protesters during a period of intense political repression under the provincial government of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan. 

Historical accounts give different death tolls. Former Pakistani diplomat Rustam Shah Mohmand reported in 2019 that more than 600 people were killed and approximately 1,500 critically wounded. These figures remain disputed.

Babra became a lasting symbol of the conflict between state authority and political dissent. For the movement’s supporters, the victims had struggled for political dignity; the authorities viewed the confrontation through the lens of public order and opposition to the state.

Local accounts also allege that families were charged for bullets used against protesters, a practice commonly referred to as “bullet money.” This allegation requires further documentary verification before its precise details can be treated as fact.

The massacre weakened the Khudai Khidmatgar movement and deepened mistrust between sections of Pashtun society and the state. It also raises an enduring question: why did a movement that had fought colonial rule through non-violence face such severe repression after independence? 

4. Wali Khan and Provincial Autonomy

Bacha Khan’s son, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, became a leading figure in Pakistan’s struggle for provincial autonomy. He led the National Awami Party (NAP), which advocated parliamentary democracy, regional rights, and greater provincial authority.

In the 1970 elections, the NAP emerged as a major force in the NWFP and Balochistan. Mufti Mahmood of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam became chief minister of the NWFP, with NAP participation in the provincial government.

The arrangement offered an opportunity for democratic cooperation between regional parties and the federal government. However, relations deteriorated under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 

In February 1973, Bhutto dismissed the NAP-led government in Balochistan. The NWFP ministry resigned in protest. The NAP was later banned, and Wali Khan and other leaders faced prosecution in the Hyderabad conspiracy case.

The federal government justified its actions on security grounds, while the NAP regarded the crackdown as an attack on political opposition and provincial autonomy.

The episode demonstrated a persistent weakness in Pakistan’s federal system: electoral success did not always protect regional governments from central intervention.

Bacha Khan had challenged colonial rule through non-violent resistance; Wali Khan pursued constitutional politics within Pakistan. Their experiences illustrate the importance of dialogue, democratic competition, and accommodation of regional identities.

5. Governor’s Rule: 1975, 1994, and 2026

Governor’s Rule must be distinguished from martial law and other forms of 

emergency administration. Article 234 of Pakistan’s Constitution provides for

intervention when provincial government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. Article 232 addresses emergencies in circumstances including war or internal disturbance beyond a provincial government’s capacity to control. The former NWFP experienced Governor’s Rule in 1975 and 1994.

The 1975 crisis 

Governor’s Rule was imposed on 16 February 1975, following the assassination of Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao, a senior Pakistan Peoples Party leader, in a bomb attack at the University of Peshawar on 8 February. 

The assassination intensified the confrontation between Bhutto’s government and the NAP. The subsequent political crackdown, including the banning of the NAP, deepened the conflict over regional autonomy. 

Governor’s Rule ended on 3 May 1975, when Nasrullah Khan Khattak became chief minister. The intervention changed the provincial administration, but the underlying political tensions remained.

The 1994 crisis 

Governor’s Rule was imposed again in February 1994 during Benazir Bhutto’s second government. The provincial government led by Pir Sabir Shah was removed, and Governor Khurshid Ali Khan assumed responsibility for provincial affairs. The arrangement ended in April, when Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao became chief minister. The episode reflected the political instability that characterised Pakistan’s parliamentary system during the 1990s. 

The 2026 crisis 

On 11 October 2026, the federal government announced emergency measures and Governor’s Rule in KP. It accused the PTI-led provincial government of failing to address rising militancy. PTI rejected the allegations and questioned the decision’s constitutional and political legitimacy.

The legal basis, parliamentary proceedings, duration, and any judicial challenges require careful examination. The decision should be judged according to constitutional requirements, not simply the arguments of either political camp.

The larger lesson is that extraordinary executive powers may change who governs, but they cannot automatically eliminate militancy, restore public trust, or resolve disagreements over provincial autonomy.

6. The Afghan Jihad 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 transformed the region. Under General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan became a major base for supporting Afghan resistance groups, receiving extensive assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The resistance was not a single organisation. It consisted of different factions with competing ideologies, leaders, and foreign connections.

For Afghans, the conflict was a struggle against Soviet occupation. For Washington, it was part of the Cold War. For Pakistan’s military leadership, Afghanistan also represented an opportunity to expand regional influence and respond to perceived strategic threats from India.

The conflict strengthened armed networks, expanded weapons flows, and deepened the links between religious mobilisation and regional security policy. 

Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, but Afghanistan did not achieve lasting peace. Rival factions continued fighting, and the Taliban movement emerged in the 1990s. 

Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan conflict was not the sole cause of Afghanistan’s instability. Afghan political rivalries and other foreign interventions also played important roles. Nevertheless, the policies adopted during the jihad had consequences that extended far beyond their original objectives. 

7. Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban

The Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are distinct organisations, although they have ideological connections and overlapping relationships. 

The Afghan Taliban emerged during Afghanistan’s civil war and captured Kabul

in 1996. Pakistan was among the countries that recognised its government. After the US-led intervention in 2001, the Taliban continued as an insurgency.

The TTP was established in 2007 as an umbrella organisation of Pakistani militant factions. It directed attacks against Pakistan’s security forces, government institutions, and civilians.

The distinction matters because the two organisations have different histories, leadership structures, and objectives. They should not be treated as a single organisation operating under one command. 

The rise of the TTP demonstrated how militancy associated with the Afghan conflict could also threaten Pakistan itself. 

The December 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar, in which more than 140 people were killed, most of them children, remains one of the darkest episodes in Pakistan’s modern history. 

The tragedy exposed the human cost of militant violence. Whatever the original strategic calculations, ordinary Pakistanis paid an enormous price. 

8. The Haqqani Network 

The Haqqani network, founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, developed during the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan and later became an influential component of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.

Following the Taliban government’s removal from power in 2001, the network

continued fighting Afghan government forces and international troops. The United States repeatedly accused it of using Pakistani territory as a sanctuary, particularly in the former tribal areas.

In September 2012, the US State Department designated the Haqqani network a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, became the Taliban government’s interior minister.

The network became a major source of tension between Washington and Islamabad. American officials accused Pakistan of failing to act decisively against militant sanctuaries, while Pakistani officials disputed allegations and emphasised the country’s own losses in the fight against terrorism. 

The controversy illustrates a difficult strategic question: can armed groups be tolerated because they appear useful against a foreign adversary without eventually becoming a threat to regional stability? 

Militant organisations develop their own interests, alliances, and ambitions. Their future behaviour cannot always be controlled by those who once supported or tolerated them.

9. Hillary Clinton’s Warning

During her visit to Pakistan on 21 October 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged greater cooperation against militant groups, including the Haqqani network. She offered a memorable warning: “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours.”

The analogy expressed concern that armed groups operating from Pakistani territory could eventually threaten Pakistan itself. 

The expression “good Taliban and bad Taliban” subsequently became a common description of the alleged distinction between militants considered strategically useful and those attacking the Pakistani state. It was a political shorthand, not a formal classification of every militant organisation or a complete description of all Pakistani security policies. 

Nevertheless, the underlying risk was serious. A group that appears useful in one conflict may eventually become a source of insecurity. 

Pakistan’s experience with the TTP demonstrated the dangers of allowing militant networks to flourish. Security personnel, teachers, students, political leaders, and ordinary citizens became victims of terrorism. 

Clinton’s warning remains relevant because it highlights the long-term dangers of inconsistent policies towards armed non-state actors. 

10. The People of KP and the Cost of Conflict 

The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have endured militancy, military operations, displacement, damaged schools, disrupted businesses, and the loss of family members. 

The former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, merged into KP in 2018, experienced particularly severe instability. Many families were displaced during periods of militant control and counterterrorism operations. 

The people living in these areas were not merely observers of the conflict;

they were among its principal victims. 

Security is essential, but it must be accompanied by education, employment, justice, accountable policing, and effective public services. Military operations may be necessary against armed groups, yet lasting peace also requires rebuilding public confidence. 

Pashtun identity should never be equated with militancy. The traditions of Bacha Khan and Wali Khan, along with the work of teachers, journalists, reformers, and civil society, demonstrate the diversity of political thought and social life in the province.

The people of KP deserve safety, democratic representation, and opportunities for a better future.

Why This History Matters for Students

This article offers students a framework for understanding Pakistan’s political development, federalism, constitutional emergencies, the independence movement, and the evolution of militancy in the region. It also encourages critical thinking by distinguishing historical facts from contested claims and examining how domestic politics and international conflicts influence one another. 

Students can use the chronology to prepare history and Pakistan Studies assignments, develop essay arguments, and understand why political decisions must be assessed through evidence, constitutional principles, and their long-term consequences.

Selected References

·       Banerjee, Mukulika. The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier. James Currey, 2000. 

·       Khan, Abdul Ghaffar. My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan. Paloma Press, 1969.

·       Shah, Aqil. The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Harvard University Press, 2014. 

·       Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2000. 

·       Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Articles 232 and 234. 

·       US Department of State, Hillary Clinton’s remarks in Islamabad, 21 October 2011. 

·       US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, sections on the Haqqani network.

·       Contemporary historical accounts of the dismissal of the NWFP ministry in 1947 and the Babra massacre in 1948.

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